Bob La Trémouille reports:
I mailed the following letter yesterday to the Cambridge City Council:
July 25, 2008
City Council
City of Cambridge
c/o City Clerk
Cambridge City Hall
795 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
RE: Monteiro v. Cambridge
Middlesex County Civil Docket MICV2001-02737
Gentlemen/Ladies:
Soon, the Cambridge City Council will be faced with a decision as to whether the City should appeal the judgment in the Monteiro case or, as the jury would seem to consider appropriate, fire the Cambridge City Manager plus, perhaps, the Cambridge City Solicitor.
The very major penal damages awarded by the jury in addition to major actual damages indicate rather strong contempt by the jury for the behavior of the City of Cambridge in this matter.
Should the City of Cambridge choose to accept the jury decision, a good deal of money is readily available by killing the outrageous environmental projects at Magazine Beach and Fresh Pond.
Since the jobs of the Cambridge City Manager and Cambridge City Solicitor are at stake, it would seem highly inappropriate that either participate in deliberations as advisors to the Cambridge City Council and, instead, be considered potential targets for personnel actions.
I did not witness the trial and the file on the case is not available. The file is on the desk of Justice Bonnie H. MacLeod who presided over the trial. I have reviewed the docket and have read the report in the Cambridge Chronicle.
The jury verdict was entered on May 23, 2008. The Cambridge Chronicle reports that the plaintiff was awarded more than $1 million in actual damages and $3.5 million in penal damages. These actions were taken in response to a complaint by the plaintiff that she had been fired in retaliation for her filing a civil rights complaint against the City of Cambridge.
On May 29, 2008, Cambridge moved for prompt hearing on post trial motions. On June 12, 2008, post trial motions were filed including Cambridge’s motion to set aside the verdict or reduce the award. On June 19, a hearing was held on the motions. Cambridge has since, on July 3, filed “Defendant’s Post Trial Submissions,” and, on July 15, filed “Defendant City of Cambridge’s MOTION to supplement record on appeal.”
Justice Catherine A. White presided over the original trial in which the jury was deadlocked on the issue of retaliation by Cambridge because the plaintiff filed the basic civil rights complaint.
Cambridge moved that Justice White find for the city on the issue of retaliation after the jury deadlocked. Justice White’s order in response, by electronic copy from the docket, is attached.
The relevant portion of Justice White’s order reads:
"Evidence at the trial of this matter demonstrated that, admittedly, a long period of time elapsed between plaintiff's initial complaint of discrimination and the ultimate decision to terminate her. However, there was also evidence of a number of incidents that could arguably be viewed as retaliatory and not neutral events. Accordingly, this Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the passage of time makes plaintiff's retaliation claim untenable."
Justice White talks about a “number of incidents.”
It is unlikely that the evidence in the second trial was less favorable to the plaintiff. The jury verdict very clearly responds to what Justice White refers to as a “number of incidents.”
Cambridge is asking Justice MacLeod not only to reverse the jury verdict but also to reverse the order of Justice White.
Such a reversal by Justice MacLeod seems highly unlikely.
What is highly likely is that Justice MacLeod is spending a lot of time providing written documentation of the “number of incidents.”
The jury clearly considered the behavior of the Cambridge City Manager reprehensible. It is highly unlikely that the Cambridge City Manager accomplished this behavior without advice of the Cambridge City Solicitor.
Neither the Cambridge City Manager nor the Cambridge City Solicitor should participate as advisors in your consideration of whether to appeal or to take disciplinary action against the Cambridge City Manager plus perhaps against the Cambridge City Solicitor.
Thank you in advance for taking behavior appropriate for a City Council which states that it is pro-civil rights.
Sincerely,
Robert J. La Trémouille
Attachment 1, Monteiro v. Cambridge, Middlesex Superior Court Civil Action MICV2001- 02737, paper 81, June 2, 2005, electronic copy of docket entry. [Ed: In the letter, this is a direct electronic copy of the docket. The docket is in tabular format. The numbers are in cells on the left. The text is in cells on the right. The tabular format has been lost in copying to this blog. In my edits, I have tried to block off the text to make it read better. My blocking has also been lost. Another possible edit would be to drop the numbers on the left. I have chosen not to do that edit because of my opinion that that edit would not be true to what was transmitted.]
ORDER on Defendant's Motion for
Directed Verdict and/or
2 Reconsideration of the Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict:
3 Evidence at the trial of this matter demonstrated that, admittedly, a
4 long period of time elapsed between plaintiff's initial complaint of
5 discrimination and the ultimate decision to terminate her. However,
6 there was also evidence of a number of incidents that could arguably
7 be viewed as retaliatory and not neutral events. Accordingly, this
8 Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the passage of time
9 makes plaintiff's retaliation claim untenable. Plaintiff's statement
10 of supplemental authority, forwarded to the Court on April 21, 2005
11 does not persuade the Court to change its earlier rulings.
12 Accordingly, this motion to reconsider the Court's earlier denial of
13 a motion for directed verdict on this issue is denied, and the motion
14 for directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence remains
15 denied. Finally, the request for a Rule 64(a) report to the Appeals
16 Court is also denied. ORDER on Defendant's Motion for Directed
17 Verdict and/or Reconsideration of the Denial of Motion for Directed
18 Verdict: Evidence at the trial of this matter demonstrated that,
19 admittedly, a long period of time elapsed between plaintiff's initial
20 complaint of discrimination and the ultimate decision to terminate
21 her. However, there was also evidence of a number of incidents that
22 could arguably be viewed as retaliatory and not neutral events.
23 Accordingly, this Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the
24 passage of time makes plaintiff's retaliation claim untenable.
25 Plaintiff's statement of supplemental authority, forwarded to the
26 Court on April 21, 2005 does not persuade the Court to change its
27 earlier rulings. Accordingly, this motion to reconsider the Court's
28 earlier denial of a motion for directed verdict on this issue is
29 denied, and the motion for directed verdict at the close of all of
30 the evidence remains denied. Finally, the request for a Rule 64(a)
31 report to the Appeals Court is also denied. Dated: May 27, 2005
32 (White, Catherine A.) Justice of the Superior Court. Dated: May 27,
33 2005
